In the third stage (feedback stage), participants were informed about their own contribution to the private 140 and group account, the overall group contribution, their own punishment (reduction), and their payoff.
141
Non-punishers were informed of the contributions of other group members only in the high-transparency 142 treatment. Non-punishers were never informed of punishment meted out to others -this was made public 143 in the instructions to avoid leadership and reputational concerns.
144
Hence, we used a 2 (low power vs. high power) × 2 (low transparency vs. high transparency) between-145 subjects design. We will denote the high-power treatments (where the punisher was equipped with 120 
Additional measurements

151
We also collected data on spite (Marcus et al., 2014 ), rivalry & narcissism (Back et al., 2013 , and social 152 value orientation (SVO) to increase the robustness of our results.
153
To measure SVO, we used the 6-items primary ring matching version of the Slider Measure (see Murphy only one of the 6 items was randomly chosen to become payoff-relevant in case this task was paid. Either 156 2 To avoid framing and demand effects, we referred to the act as "reducing the payoff". 3 Note that the benefit of free-riding, compared to full contribution, is 10 tokens. If the punisher were confronted with three free-riders and utilized all 30 punishment tokens, he could make every free-rider indifferent between free-riding and fully contributing, by punishing each with 10 tokens. As soon as one subject contributes more than zero, the punisher can already make contributing a preferential option. Hence, 30 tokens are sufficient to ensure punishment to be deterrent. 4 In case of payoff-relevant equipment, the punisher could contribute more in stage one, anticipating extra gains in the second stage. If there was no extra equipment, the punisher could contribute less in stage one, compensating his extra expenditure in stage two. 4 the slider-measure or the public-goods-game task was chosen with equal probability to be payoff-relevant, 
Data Analysis
173
The subsequent data analysis will be structured as follows: We will start by defining abuse as the core 174 concept of our study. Our data will demonstrate high levels of abuse overall, with power having a corrupting 175 effect under low transparency. Combining power with high transparency leads to significantly less abuse 176 even compared with low-power treatments. We will show that abusive behavior is driven by increasing 177 contribution norms that punishers enforce, while themselves undercutting their norm and the contributions 178 of non-punishers. 
Abuse of Punishment Power
180
Our main goal in this paper is to investigate whether punishers abuse their position of power. We define 181 abuse as the deviation of the punisher's contribution from his own imposed contribution norm.
7 Hence,
182
a punisher who imposes a norm of 18 in the current round, but contributes only 5, is behaving abusively.
183
How abusively the punishers behave is described by the difference between his imposed norm in the current 184 round and his contribution in the respective round. In this example the amount of abusive behavior would 185 be 13.
186
Our definition of abusive behavior builds on two concepts: the contribution of the punisher and the 187 imposed norm. The punisher's contribution is simply the amount the punisher contributed to the public-188 good. The imposed norm, on the other hand, is how much the punisher expects others to contribute. We 189 assume punishment to be an expression of the punisher's violated expectations, which in turn are based on a
190
contribution norm: We see in the sanction of contributions an indicator that the implicit norm was violated,
191
and if a contribution is not sanctioned, we consider the contribution to fulfill the norm. Hence, only one random problem was selected to become payoff-relevant which is the only incentive-compatible mechanism (see Azrieli et al., 2015 , for a detailed argument).
6 The video instruction with English subtitles can be found in the supplementary materials. An English version of the handout as well as screenshots of the experiment can also be found in the supplementary materials.
7 In Appendix A.1, we also consider alternative definitions of abuse. We consider a simplistic approach, merely comparing the punishers' contribution with the average of the non-punishers. The derived results are virtually identical.
8 Note that we consider already a small punishment as an indicator for norm violations, and hence, our definition of the imposed norm does not hinge on the punishment strength. For an analysis of punishment strength, we refer the reader to Appendix A.2.
norm.
9 Even though once-established norms are rarely abandoned, we consider all rounds where a punisher
195
did not enforce an already established norm as not abusive to be conservative in our estimates.
10
196
Over all treatments, 83.3 % of subjects abused their power at least once. and a control for the last round, as well as subject-specific random effects is reported in We can see that abusive behavior increases over time. Hence, subjects learn to abuse their power.
207
Under low transparency, power corrupts: Punishers in the high-power treatment abused their position 208 more strongly over time. This effect supports our first hypothesis, namely that high power leads to more 209 abuse.
210 Surprisingly, the effect of transparency was the opposite of our expectations (hypothesis two): under 211 low power, it marginally increased abusive behavior. Hence, transparency was not only not helpful, it was 212 actually harmful in the low-power treatment.
213
Concerning our third hypothesis, namely that high power impedes the effect of high transparency (in the 214 sense that increased transparency will not have an effect on abusive behavior under high power), we find,
215
remarkably the opposite effect. Transparency curbed abuse over time under high power.
216
Result 1 a 83.3 % of all punishers abused their power at least once.
217
Result 1 b Abuse increased over time.
218
Result 1 c Power corrupts under low transparency: The increase in abusive behavior over time was 219 stronger under high power compared to low power.
220
Result 1 d Transparency has a marginally significant negative effect on abusive behavior in the low power 221 setting.
222
Result 1 e Increased transparency reduces abusive behavior significantly in the high power setting.
223
9 As in all treatments the punisher had enough punishment points to deter any contribution behavior, strategic or scarcity considerations can be excluded.
10 Note that the results do not change by using a more lenient approach. The lenient approach could be easily defended as a once-established norm implies a thread-level and hence results in similar beliefs for non-punishers, even if the norm is not enforced on rare occasions.
11 Note: We use a linear model as this seems sufficiently reasonable given the development over time. However, we also relax this assumption in Appendix B.3.1. For that purpose, we estimate a common loess abuse spline over rounds over all treatments. Using a Bayesian approach, we compare the curvity of the contribution over time of all the treatments. All results are fundamentally identical to the results reported in this section. In the next two subsections, we will examine what was driving abusive behavior. For that purpose, we 224 will first investigate how the imposed norm changes in the four treatments before describing the contribution 225 behavior. 
Imposed Norm
227
In this section, we investigate the norms punishers enforced.
12
228
We measured for all punishers the norm they imposed. The average development over time of those 229 norms by treatment are shown in Figure 2 . By definition, the norm either stabilizes or increases. After 230 roughly 10 rounds, the average imposed norm stabilizes and stays roughly constant for all treatments. Note 231 that we found almost no instances of punishers ceasing punishment and giving up an already established 232 norm.
233
Using a linear regression 13 for the imposed norm with fixed effects of treatments, time, the interaction 234 of both and controlling for subject-specific random effects, we see in Table 3 that high power leads to a 235 stronger increase in the imposed norm, although this effect is reversed if transparency is high.
236
All results are robust to the inclusion of controls.
237
Result 2 a High power leads to higher imposed norms over time. Transparency reverses this effect under 238 high power.
239
Result 2 b Increased transparency does not affect the imposed norm under low power.
240
12 Here, we look at the norms punishers imposed individually as we are interested in abusive behavior. For an analysis of punishment behavior on average see Appendix A.2
13 Note: In Appendix B.2, we estimate a common loess spline over all treatments, and using a Bayesian approach, we compare the curvity of all the treatments. The implication of the results are very similar. Additionally we estimate the imposed norm separately for the first ten and the remaining rounds in Appendix A.4. Again, results are robust. . p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; * * p < 0.01; * * * p < 0.001; Table 3 : Linear mixed-effects model of the imposed norm. Controls include age, gender, spite, SVO, narcissism, rivalry, and the interaction of those variables with the period.
Hence, it seems like the abusive behavior is driven by the norm punishers imposed. The imposed norm 241 is strongest in the high-power, low-transparency treatment, and the norm is the lowest in the high-power, 
Contribution behavior
245
In a last step, the contribution behavior of all participants will be analyzed. Treatment effects are reported in Table 4 via a mixed-effects linear regression with fixed effects for the 258 treatments and random effects for subjects and groups, while controlling for the contribution in the last 259 round. In Table 3 , we also included age, gender, spite, rivalry, narcissism and SVO, and the interaction of 260 the mentioned factors with time as controls. All results are robust to those controls.
Result 3 a Punishers contribute far less then non-punishers.
262
14 Average of the standard deviations over all rounds. 15 This effect has also been reported in Hoeft and Mill (2017) for the low-power treatments.
16 Note that we do not necessarily argue that the non-punisher's behavior is directly driven by the treatments. It might well be that the change in contribution is due to differently imposed norms, which are directly influenced by the treatments. We nevertheless want to describe how contribution behavior changes, directly or indirectly, due to the treatments. 17 We use a linear model as this is a common approach in the estimation of contribution behavior in public-goods experiments (see, for example, Fehr and Gächter, 2002 , Nikiforakis, 2010 , Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008 . However, like in the two previous sections, we also relax this assumption in Appendix B.1.1 and Appendix B.1.2. For that purpose, we estimate a common loess contribution spline over rounds over all treatments. Using a Bayesian approach, we compare the curvity of the contribution over time of all the treatments. The results are qualitatively identical to the results reported here. . p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; * * p < 0.01; * * * p < 0.001; Table 4 : Linear mixed-effects model of the contribution to the public-good. Controls include age, gender, spite, SVO, narcissism, rivalry, and the interaction of those variables with the period.
Standard errors are in brackets.
Summarizing the contribution behavior, we can see that the contribution of punishers is increasing only Hence, the treatment differences in abusive behavior are mainly driven by the imposed norm. However,
271
the difference in contribution behavior strengthens the effect of transparency in the high power setting. is to use the institutional power for selfish gains by undercutting the institutional purpose, thereby harming 276 others indirectly. This is often done by enforcing rules that are not adhered to by the institutional members.
277
Examples range from illegal violence by police to unjust enrichment or tax evasion by government elites.
278
We provide a first investigation of institutional second-party punishers in a repeated game and indeed find 279 frequent and strong abuse of power across a large majority of subjects.
280
In line with our hypothesis, we find that a (theoretically inconsequential) increase in punishment power 281 leads to participants learning to abuse their power faster over time. The results of our transparency treat-282 ments, however, run counter to our hypothesis: Instead of limiting abuse for low-power treatments, it did so 283 only for the high power one. This is an interesting finding that suggests the relationship between power and 284 transparency is more complex than previously thought. We conjecture that this finding can be explained in 285 two possible ways: On the one hand, transparency might make moral features of a situation more salient.
286
While in the low-power treatment the punisher might not realize that he has enough power to deter every-287 body from free-riding, the high powered punisher will quickly realize that he is in a position to dominate 
292
There may be evolutionary reasons why humans strongly reject stark dominance hierarchies that are not 293 culturally justified (Gintis, 2016) .
294
This should caution against the -at times overly optimistic -picture painted by the vast literature on 295 prosocial punishment. Not only a small subset, but a large part of the population were willing to bypass 296 their own norm. Further research should improve our knowledge on the complex relationship of (power) amount as a function of the contribution of the punisher and the contribution of the punished member.
414
Note that punishers were not able to punish themselves, and hence we have three decisions per round for 415 every punisher.
416
To estimate the punishment given to non-punishers we compare the contribution of those subjects to the We use the following econometric model to estimate punishment behavior:
427 P un i,k,t =β 0 + β 1 · HighPwr + β 2 · HighTrans + β 3 · HighPwr · HighTrans β 4 · t + β 5 · t · HighPwr + β 6 · t · HighTrans + β 7 · t · HighPwr · HighTrans
where HighPwr is a dummy with value one for the high-power treatment and zero otherwise. HighTrans 428 is a dummy with value one if the subject was in the high-transparency treatment and zero otherwise. c i =D,k,t 429 denotes the average contribution of all non-punishers in group k in round t and (c i =D,k,t − c i,k,t ) + denotes
430
the maximum of 0 and the deviation of the contribution of subject i from the average contribution of the 431 non-punishers. i and i,k are the level 1 and level 2 random effects of groups and individuals.
432
The results of the estimation are presented in Table A .6. It can be seen that the deviation from the 433 average contribution of the other non-punishers is punished and that this deviation is punished significantly 434 stronger under high power and also under high transparency. However, the effect of transparency is stronger 435 under low power then under high power.
436
Overall punishment was reduced over time even though punishment strength increased. Under low power, 437 transparency led to a smaller increase in punishment strength over time then under high power.
438
Result 4 a The deviation from the average contribution of non-punishers was punished harshly and in-439 creased over time.
440
Result 4 b Power as well as transparency lead to harsher punishment for the deviation from the average 441 contribution of other non-punishers.
442
Result 4 c The effect of transparency is stronger under low power than under high power.
443
Result 4 d Under low power, high transparency leads to a less severe increase in punishment over time. differentiate between the decision to punish at all and the decision on how much to punish conditional on the 455 decision to punish. Hence, we assume that subjects first make a decision to punish or not to punish. They 456 punish with probability 1 − ω, and with probability ω subjects are not punished. If subjects are punished,
457
then the punishment amount follows a normal distribution.
As subjects make two decisions, we allow two separate punishment norms, namely the punishment norm 459 on whether to punish (called γ v ) and the punishment norm on how much to punish (called γ p ).
460
We use the following econometric model similar to Carpenter and Matthews (2009):
where (x) + = max(x, 0). The norm to enforce is γ v . The norm on how much to punish is γ p . HighPwr 462 is a dummy with value one if the treatment is the high-power treatment, and zero otherwise. HighTrans 463 is a dummy with value one if the treatment is the high-transparency treatment, and zero otherwise. t is 464 the period. v i,k,t is a variable indicating whether subject i in group k was punished in period t. p i,k,t is 465 a variable indicating how much subject i in group k was punished in period t. c i,k,t denotes how much 466 subject i contributed in period t to the group account of group k. i and i,k are the level 1 and level 2 467 random effects of groups and individuals. g(·) : (0, 1) → R is the link function. We will use the logit link:
468 g(µ) = log(µ/(1 − µ)), as this is easier to interpret.
To sum up: we estimate how the deviation of a subjects' contribution from the punishment norm influences the decision to punish at all and, if so, how severely.
471
The possible punishment norms we took into account were: the average contribution of the whole 472 group, the average contribution of non-punishers, the contribution of the punisher, and absolute norms 473 (∈ {0, 0.1, ..., 19.8, 19.9, 20}). Table A .7 shows the log likelihoods of the estimations with the possible norms 474 in each treatment.
475
Several points are worth mentioning. First, it is evident that the best absolute norm for the decision 476 whether to punish is 20 in each treatment. Since many punishers undercut this norm, it suggests abuse 477 on the aggregate level. This norm also performs best for the decision to punish in all treatments but the 478 high-power, low-transparency treatment (where the average contribution of non-punishers is the best norm).
479
It is also interesting to see that the contribution of the punisher is the worst norm in any treatment in 480 either decision, which in combination with the much lower average contribution of punishers is also indicative 481 of abuse. 22 Also, the absolute norm does not perform best in the decision how much to punish.
482
It is noteworthy that the norm on how much to punish is the average contribution of non-punishers in all 483 treatments but the high-power, high-transparency treatment. This treatment is the only treatment which 484 takes the average contribution of the whole group as the norm, which is remarkable, as this implies that the 485 average punisher in this treatment takes his own contribution also into account. This, again, supports the 486 conclusion that under high power and high transparency, punishers behave less abusively (as they do not 487 differentiate between themselves and the non-punishers). . p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; * * p < 0.01; * * * p < 0.001; Table A .8: Mixed-effects estimates for punishment following the individually best norms for the respective treatments as reported in Table A. Table A .9: Mixed-effects estimates for punishment following the individual punishments norms for each treatment reported in Table A .7 while comparing the treatment effects.
488
Result 5 a Similarly to the findings by Carpenter and Matthews (2009): subjects use two distinct norms on the decision to punish and on the decision how much to punish.
as can be seen, for example, in Figure 3 , the contribution decision over time does not necessary evolve 514 linearly. To relax this assumption, we will estimate loess splines over time to allow for non-linear behavior.
515
We will take this approach for several dependent variables. For that purpose, we will estimate an average 516 20 loess spline for the respective dependent variables over time (average for all treatments) 23 , which we call 517 λ(t).
518
The following general econometric model of a dependent variable Ind will be used in the rest of the 519 paper:
520
Ind i,t =β 0 + λ(t) · (1 + β 1 · 1 HighPwr ∧ LowTrans + β 2 · 1 HighPwr ∧ HighTrans + β 3 · 1 LowPwr ∧ LowTrans + β 4 · 1 LowPwr ∧ HighTrans ) 
525
To account for the nested structure of the data we included i as the random effects of the individual i. i,k,t is the residuals.
527
As vague priors we used:
The interpretation of the βs is the following: β 0 is the intercept. β l with l ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} are the deviations 528 in the specific treatments from the average behavior over time.
529
To estimate the posterior distribution of the coefficients in equation ( within the group k, with k ∈ {1, . . . , 24}.
538
Similarly, the vague priors are: interval, the probability that β < 0, the effective sample size (sseff), and the potential scale reduction factor Table ( B.12) shows the mean estimation results, the 95% credible interval, the probability that β < 0, Figure B .6: The graphs show the 95%-credible intervals for the coefficients of the estimation results for Equation (B.1) with the dependent variable: "Contribution to the public-good of punishers". Table B .12: Bayesian estimation results for Equation (B.1) with the dependent variable: "Contribution to the public-good of punishers".
Similar to section 4.3, the contribution of punishers over time did not significantly increase, and the only 552 treatment under which the contributions increase was the high power, high-transparency treatment.
553
Appendix B.2. Imposed Norm
554
As can be seen in Figure 2 , the imposed norm does not follow a linear function, and hence we again 555 estimate Equation (B.1) with the dependent variable "imposed norm".
556 Table ( B.13) shows the mean estimation results of the estimated βs, the 95% credible interval, the 557 probability that β < 0, the effective sample size (sseff), and the potential scale reduction factor (psrf). The results of section 4.2 are replicated using loess splines. It can be seen that, under low transparency,
560
high power leads to higher imposed norms, that transparency does not have much of an effect on the imposed 561 norm under low power, and that transparency leads to lower imposed norms under high power. Appendix B.3.1. Abusive behavior defined as in main part of the paper
564
In this section we replicate the results of section 4.1 with non-linear behavior of abuse over time (as can 565 be seen in Figure B .8).
566 Table ( B.14) shows the mean estimation results of the estimated β of Equation (B.1) with dependent 567 variable "abuse" estimated by Bayesian methods, the 95% credible interval, the probability that β < 0, Table B .14: Bayesian estimation results for Equation (B.1) with the abusive behavior as the dependent variable.
Again all the results of section 4.1 are replicated using loess splines. Transparency has no effect on 571 abusive behavior in the low power setting, power corrupts under low transparency and high transparency 572 reduces abusive behavior in the high power setting.
573
Appendix B.3.2. Abusive behavior defined as the punishers deviation from the average non-punisher
574
We also estimate the non-linear behavior of abuse with the alternative definition of abuse.
575 Table ( B.15) shows the mean estimation results of the estimated β of Equation (B.1) with dependent 576 variable "deviation of punishers contribution from the average non-punishers contribution" estimated by
577
Bayesian methods, the 95% credible interval, the probability that β < 0, the effective sample size (sseff), and Table B .15: Bayesian estimation results for Equation (B.1) with the dependent variable: "deviation of punishers contribution from the average non-punishers contribution".
And here again all the results of section Appendix A.1 are replicated. Hence, all results are robust to 581 the assumption of linearity. 
